




This paper presents a puzzle about the logic of real definition. In particular, I
demonstrate that five principles concerning definition (that it is coextensional and
irreflexive, that it applies to its cases, that it permits expansion and that it is itself
defined) are incompatible. I then explore the advantages and disadvantages of each
principle—one of which must be rejected to restore consistency.
Introduction
Since the inception of our discipline, the notion of real definition has occupied a central
role—and in no field is its significance more manifest than metaphysics. Debates within
ethics, epistemology, and beyond can all be framed as searches for definitions. For, when
the ethicist provides a theory of the good, this can be reasonably understood as a putative
definition of the good, and when the epistemologist provides a theory of knowledge, this
can be reasonably understood as a putative definition of knowledge. In metaphysics, too,
definition plays this role; we might describe a theory of personhood as a view regarding the
definition of being a person, and a theory of modality as a putative definition of necessity
and possibility. But in metaphysics alone definition plays not only this external role—
as something which characterizes theories or accounts under consideration—but also an
internal role—as an object worthy of investigation itself. It is the metaphysician who
debates the nature of definition, and (perhaps caught in the grip of a rather ambitious
mood) provides an account of what definition itself is: a definition of real definition.
This is not to say that the notion of definition has gone unopposed: far from it. There
are any number of reasons why philosophers might object to the framing of our field in this
manner. Perhaps some believe that our theories are too varied for definition to unify them in
any theoretically interesting way; perhaps reality is too coarse-grained for definition to make
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the distinctions metaphysicians typically take them to make; or perhaps reifying definition
builds in a gratuitous and suspect piece of ontology.1 One objection, the response to which
constitutes the subject-matter of this paper, is that talk of ‘definition’ is unintelligible. I do
not here hope to assuage all philosophers caught in the grip of the intelligibility concern—as
Lewis aptly said, “any competent philosopher who does not understand something will take
care not to understand anything else whereby it might be explained.”2 But it is my aim
to provide clarity where, now, there is none: to bring structure to the landscape and, in so
doing, uncover a puzzle that has thus far remained hidden. For ‘definition,’ as it is used
by the metaphysician, is (among other things) a theoretical term. As such, one way to
investigate it systematically is to uncover the theoretical role that it plays.
This strategy involves applying a received view about the introduction of theoretical
terms to ‘definition.’ This view traces back to the Carnap (1958, 1966) discussion of Ramsey
Sentences, and was given new life by Lewis (1970). The underlying thought is that a theory
(whether scientific or philosophical) containing a new predicate is equivalent to its expanded
postulate: the claim that there exists a unique F that performs every function that the
predicate is taken to perform within that theory (the Ramsey Sentence, in contrast to the
expanded postulate, lacks the uniqueness claim). The theory as a whole thus amounts to
an expansive existence claim. If it is true, then there exists an F which functions as the
predicate is taken to function; if it is false, then there does not exist an F which functions as
the predicate is taken to function. Debates between adherents and skeptics of that theory
can thus be reframed as a disagreement about the existence of such an F . In the present
case, the disagreement between the adherents and skeptics of a theory of real definition can
be understood as a disagreement about whether an F exists which theoretically functions
as definition is postulated to.
In some respects, Lewis’s account can be conceived of as the metaphysical converse to
semantic ascent.3 Semantic ascent occurs when an ontological disagreement is transformed
into a semantic one. One might, for example, semantically ascend by transforming the de-
bate over whether unicorns exist into a debate about whether the predicate ‘is a unicorn’ has
a nonempty extension. But for Lewis, the direction of transformation is reversed. Instead
of framing disagreements about ontology as disagreements about semantics, disagreements
about a theory—one which contains a novel and suspect theoretical term—are transformed
into disagreements about ontology.
Lewis’s account arguably needs qualifications and refinements—refinements that, to his
credit, he acknowledged. Not all novel theoretical terms are defined by expanded postulates.
Sometimes, a term is defined explicitly; a scientist or philosopher may state what a predicate
is taken to mean when it is introduced. In these cases, the meaning of the predicate is
1Of course, one might reasonably maintain that definition is a worthy object of investigation without
endorsing the (admittedly quite implausible) claim the entirety of philosophy amounts to the search for
definitions.
2See Lewis (1986).
3See Quine (1948, 1960).
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arguably given by its explicit definition, rather than by a theory’s expanded postulate.
This allows for cases in which the expanded postulate is false, and yet the novel predicate
refers. But this qualification (well taken though it is) does not undermine Lewis’s central
point: that debates between adherents and skeptics of a theory can generally be understood
as disagreements over whether a given theoretical role is satisfied.
This reframing, however, only takes us so far. Even after a dispute is recognized to be
a disagreement over existence, it remains unclear how to adjudicate that disagreement. In
the sciences, empirical factors often come into play. Extensive experiments and observa-
tions have, for example, undermined theories of phlogiston and aether; nothing exists which
performs the theoretical role that those theories claimed. But in metaphysics, empirical
evidence often seems less relevant. Thought experiments bear on the theory of personal
identity—laboratory experiments do not. There is, however, an iron weapon within the
skeptic’s arsenal; if it can be shown that a theory’s expanded postulate is logically inconsis-
tent, then the skeptic has won. The theory is false and—equivalently—there exists no F as
adherent claims. At that fatal point, there are two ways to respond. One might abandon
the theory wholesale and adopt an alternative in its place, or—more modestly—one might
embrace a consistent fragment of the original theory.4 The task for the adherent, on the
second strategy, is to determine which consistent fragment to embrace.
It is my claim that this is the status of ‘real definition.’ Once an expanded postulate is
constructed for the theory of definition, it can be shown to be logically inconsistent. The
available responses are either to reject that theory entirely, or else to embrace a consistent
fragment of it. The bulk of this paper concerns the identification of that fragment: the
arguments for and against the principles in conflict—one of which must be rejected to
restore consistency. These principles could be stated with varying degrees of formalism,
but I suspect that a quasi-formal gloss is the most easily intelligible (reserving a version I
consider to be logically respectable for the end of this paper). They are the following:5
4This, I take it, was the strategy advanced by Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) regarding Lewis’s notion of
relative naturalness. In practice, of course, there are more options than these two. Perhaps an adherent
will claim that is some ambiguity within the expanded postulate: so that where there appears to be a
contradiction, there is in fact none. For the purposes of this paper, I will only consider logically precise
theories—ones that do not admit of ambiguity.
5Within this paper, I also assume that classical logic holds. I doubt that that assumption is responsible
for this conflict; all inferences used to derive the contradiction are admissible on an intuitionist logic, and
while a free logic blocks the penultimate inference, I see no independent reason to adopt a free logic in this
context. Here, ‘Def(F,G)’ is intended to be read as ‘F is, by definition, G’.
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COEXTENTIONALITY: Def(F,G) → ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx)
IRREFLEXIVITY: ¬∃F (Def(F, F ))
CASE CONGRUENCE: Def(F,G) → ∀x(Def(Fx,Gx))
EXPANSION: (Def(F,G) ∧Def(H, I)) → Def(F,G[I/H])
DEFINABILITY: ∃F (Def(Def, F ))
The expanded postulate for this theory of definition, then, results from conjoining these
five principles and replacing occurrences of ‘Def’ with a variable bound by a (higher order
and uniqued) existential quantifier.
Before proceeding to the conflict at hand, it is worth briefly clarifying what these prin-
ciples mean. Coextentionality states that if F is, by definition G, then F and G are
coextensive: an object is F just in case it is G. So, for example, if to be a triangle is, by
definition, to be a three-angled polygon, then an object is a triangle just in case it is a
three-angled polygon. There are no triangles that are not three angled polygons—nor are
there three angled polygons that are not triangles. Irreflexivity precludes reflexive defini-
tions. It cannot be that to be a person is, by definition, to be a person, or that justice is,
by definition, justice. Case Congruence claims that definitions apply to their cases. If to
be a brother is, by definition, to be a male sibling, then for John to be a brother is, by
definition, for John to be a male sibling. And if to be a moral agent is, by definition, to be
bound by the categorical imperative, then for Sarah to be a moral agent is, by definition,
for Sarah to be bound by the categorical imperative. Expansion licenses the substitution
of some definitions within the contents of others. If {2} is, by definition, the set containing
only the number 2 and the number 2 is, by definition, the successor to the number 1 then
{2} is, by definition, the set containing only the successor to the number 1. And if to be a
bachelor is, by definition, to be an unmarried male and to be unmarried is, by definition, to
lack a marriage, then to be a bachelor is, by definition, to be a male who lacks a marriage.
Definability, lastly, states that there exists a definition of real definition—without taking a
stand on what the content of that definition is. It asserts that there is some definition of
definition or other; definition is not itself a primitive.
I take it that the commitment to these principles is widespread. As we shall see, this
commitment is sometimes made explicit; often, it manifests in practice. Moreover, I have no
doubt that many would add further criteria to their preferred expanded postulate: criteria
reflecting any additional theoretical work that metaphysicians take definition to perform.
But it is enough to begin.
4
The inconsistency between these principles is brought about in the following way:6
i) Def(Def,D) Definability
ii) Def(Def(Def,D), D(Def,D)) i, Case Congruence
iii) Def(Def(Def,D), D(D,D)) i, ii Definitional Expansion
iv) Def(Def,D) ↔ D(D,D) iii, Coextensionality
v) D(D,D) i, iv Classical Logic
vi) Def(D,D) ↔ D(D,D) i, Coextensionality
vii) Def(D,D) v, vi, Classical Logic
viii) ∃F (Def(F, F )) vii, Classical Logic
ix ) ⊥ viii, Irreflexivity
The expanded postulate for this theory of definition is logically inconsistent, and is
therefore false. Those who would continue operate with a notion of definition must articulate
which part of the theory they reject—i.e., must identify at least one of the five principles
to abandon—and provide a justification for doing so.
Of course, one argumentative technique is apparent; anyone who accepted four of these
principles could employ them to derive the negation of the fifth. But that is no help in
determining which four to select. What we seek are independent considerations—ones
entirely unrelated to this puzzle—that can guide our hand in determining what to do. It
is the discussion of these considerations that will occupy the remainder of this paper. For
what it’s worth, I suspect that many metaphysicians will be loathe to reject the principles
I have the least to say about (coextensionality and irreflexivity); they are starting points in
a theory of real definition. However, I ultimately take no stand on how this puzzle ought
to be resolved. What I offer are the advantages and disadvantages of each principle. How
to weigh these competing considerations is a task I ultimately leave to the reader.
Coextentionality
Coextensionality amounts to the claim that if F is, by definition G, then an object is F
just in case it is G. If to be morally right is, by definition, to comply with the categorical
6Let ‘D’ represent the content of the definition of definition—whatever that content might be.
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imperative, then an act is morally right just in case it complies with the categorical imper-
ative. And if to believe that p is, by definition, to be disposed to act as if p, then there are
neither cases in which an agent believes that p yet is not disposed to act as if p, nor cases
in which an agent is disposed to act as if p yet does not believe that p.
There are several reasons to maintain that coextensionality is true. Perhaps the most
persuasive is an appeal to philosophical practice. Philosophers regularly dismiss putative
definitions on the basis of counterexamples. Because there are plausible cases of justified
true beliefs that are not cases of knowledge, many deny that knowledge is, by definition,
justified true belief.7 If coextensionality were false, the presence of justified true beliefs that
are not knowledge would pose no threat to the view that knowledge is justified true belief.
To the extent to which other disciplines engage in the search for definitions, the tacit com-
mitment to coextensionality appears widespread. On one conception, many chemists search
for the definitions of chemical compounds; for, upon uncovering the molecular structure of
a given compound, the chemist reveals what the definition of that compound is. If coexten-
sionality were false, this practice would be undermined. A chemist may find instances of
a compound C that are not instances of molecular structure M without this undermining
the claim that C is, by definition, M .
Another route to coextensionality passes through identity. Many maintain that if F is,
by definition G, then F and G are identical (that is to say, that definitions are a subset of
identity claims).8 I take it that the general thought behind this is the following: whatever
definition is, it ought to be reductive. If molecules are defined by their atomic makeup,
then those molecules are nothing over and above that atomic makeup. And if normative
properties can be defined in purely non-normative terms, then the normative properties can
be reduced to non-normative properties. Accounts of definition that fall short of identity
arguably fail these reductive ambitions. How could it be that F reduces to G if F remains
distinct from G—as something which independently exists? But if definition entails identity,
then Leibniz’s Law comes into play.9 That is to say, if F and G are identical, then they
bear the same properties; each bears the property contains object a within its extension just
in case the other does—and similarly so for all other objects. And, for this reason, F and
G are coextensive.
It is worth pausing to consider how weak a commitment coextensionality is. The meta-
physical orthodoxy is that definition is co-intensional. That is, if F is, by definition, G,
then F and G have the same extension in every possible world.10 Cointensionality is strictly
7See, canonically, Gettier (1963).
8See Correia (2017) for someone who assumes without argument that this is true.
9Strictly, a higher-order analogue of Leibniz’s Law comes into play. There have recently been numer-
ous discussions of higher order systems that abandon Leibniz’s Law; see Caie, Goodman and Lederman
(Forthcoming); Bacon and Russell (2019); Bacon (2019).
10It was once widely held that this conditional could be strengthened into a biconditional: that is, F is,
by definition G, iff F and G have the same extension in every possible world. However, following examples
provided by Fine (1994, 1995a), many maintain that there are necessary connections between properties
that are not definitions. Nevertheless, these examples do not undermine the conditional above.
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stronger than coextensionality (at least if we assume the T axiom: □P → P ), so those who
subscribe to the received wisdom must maintain that coextensionality is true. There is,
however, a small (yet growing) group of philosophers who deny that definition is cointen-
sional.11 These philosophers often argue that there is no adequate explanation for the link
between definition and modality. Perhaps definitions hold contingently; it may be that in
the actual world water is, by definition, the chemical compound H2O, but that in a different
possible world water is, by definition, the chemical compound XY Z. I myself find these
arguments deeply unpersuasive, but we need take no stand on their merits here.12 Coex-
tensionality makes no assumptions about extensions in other possible worlds; the actual
world will do.
Moreover, I note that the general form of coextensionality follows from its propositional
instance (according to which if p is, by definition, q, then p holds iff q holds) and case
congruence. To see why this is the case, take an arbitrary F and G such that F is, by
definition, G—and an arbitrary object a. Case congruence entails that Fa is, by definition,
Ga, and the propositional instance of coextensionality then entails Fa ↔ Ga. Because the
selection of a was arbitrary, F and G are coextensive. Those committed to case congruence
and the propositional instance of coextensionality are thus committed to coextensionality
in its full generality.13
If there are independent reasons to reject coextensionality, I am not aware of them.
Irreflexivity
Irreflexivity is the claim that there are no reflexive definitions. Like coextensionality, ir-
reflexivity is perhaps best defended by an appeal to philosophical practice. Strange as the
literature on personal identity undoubtedly is, I know of no one who claims that Socrates
is, by definition, Socrates. And while there are those who have argued that knowledge is
primitive, I know of no one who has suggested that knowledge is, by definition, knowledge.
If reflexive definitions were admissible, these would be glaring possibilities that we, as a
philosophical community, have overlooked. Conversely, our collective refusal to regard these
possibilities as legitimate reflects our collective commitment to irreflexivity.
Some endorse irreflexivity, not because they are overly concerned with our practice, but
rather because they maintain that definition is itself defined in terms of another irreflexive
relation. In various ways, Rosen (2015), Correia (2017), and Horvath (2017) each propose
a definition of definition in terms of grounding: an asymmetric relation of metaphysical
dependence.14 A bit roughly, if F is, by definition, G, then the fact that Fa is grounded
11See Leech (2018, Forthcoming); Mackie (2020); Romeros (2019). These discussions are framed in terms
of the link between essence and modality, but I take it that they could be restated in terms of the link
between definition and modality.
12See Elgin (Forthcominga).
13I discuss the relation between coextensionality and case congruence in more depth below.
14Correia also proposes an account in terms of relative naturalness. What follows is a rough gloss on
7
in the fact that Ga. If to be morally right is, by definition, to maximize utility, then the
fact that an act maximizes utility grounds the fact that it is morally right. Because no
facts ground themselves, definition is an irreflexive relation. Notably, each author takes the
irreflexivity of definition to be not only a feature, but a virtue. That is to say, they take
to be a mark in favor of their respective accounts that they preclude reflexive definitions.
This might reasonably be taken to indicate that the commitment to irreflexivity runs deep.
What reasons are there to reject irreflexivity? Some might due to plausible counterex-
amples. Contemporary cases of reflexive definitions are scarce, but historical examples are
comparatively abundant.15 A particularly notable example is that of substance in Spinoza
(1677 (1996)).
Spinoza held that everything which exists is either a substance or a mode of that sub-
stance. A substance is something which needs nothing else in order to exist. Many of
Spinoza’s contemporaries (as well as many of his predecessors and successors) held that
there is a multiplicity of substances. In contrast, Spinoza held that there is but a single
substance: God. Everything else—the entirety of the world we observe around us—are
simply modes (or properties) of God. But for the present discussion, the important point
isn’t Spinoza’s defense of monism, but rather his account of substance. He claimed, “By
substance, I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself: in other words,
that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.” Strictly
speaking, Spinoza’s claim is no violation of irreflexivity. He does not assert ‘A substance
is, by definition, a substance’ (indeed, the term ‘substance’ appears on only one side of
the conditional)—but this might be seen as a quibble over details, rather than substance.
Spinoza’s account, we might think, is as close to an explicit denial of irreflexivity as we
can reasonably expect to find. A substance is something which is in and conceived in it-
self.16 Those who adopt a Spinozistic conception of substance thus have a reason to reject
their views that warrant further refinement. For example, while Rosen takes grounding to be a relation
between facts, Correia holds that it is a relation between generics. I direct those interested in the details
of these accounts to the original papers.
15One possible exception to the (otherwise remarkably widespread) contemporary endorsement of irreflex-
ivity is Jenkins (2011). Jenkins explicitly addresses metaphysical dependence rather than definition, but I
suspect her arguments could be restated in terms of definition equally well. She argues that metaphysicians
are sometimes tempted to claim that Paul’s pain depends upon his C-fibers firing, and are, at other times,
tempted to claim that Paul’s pain simply is his C-fibers firing. These views are compatible if Paul’s pain
depends upon itself.
16There is room for dispute over the status of Spinoza’s definitions; it is not entirely clear whether they
are real—the definitions of things themselves—or merely nominal—the definitions of words. The quote
above somewhat suggests a nominal definition of ‘substance.’ The phrase ‘By substance, I mean that
which...’ indicates that Spinoza was specifying the meaning of a word. After all, words have meanings,
while substance need not. What’s more, within his preface to Spinoza’s René Descartes Principles of
Philosophy, Lodewijk Meyer claims, “Definitions are nothing but the clearest explanations of the words and
terms by which the things to be discussed are designated.” This clearly states that the given definitions are
nominal and—since Spinoza consented for the preface to appear in his book—can reasonably be taken to
reflect his views. If Spinoza’s definition of substance is a nominal definition, it need not violate irreflexivity,
which is a principle regarding real definition. For a discussion of this point, see Lin (2019).
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irreflexivity. Because substance is defined reflexively, there are reflexive definitions.
However, I suspect that most contemporary philosophers who reject irreflexivity will
do so, not because they have particular counterexamples in mind, but rather because they
maintain that identity performs the theoretical work often attributed to definition. This
may seem particularly appealing given the recent literature on identification—a targeted
reading of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G,’ in which the ‘is’ shares the logical
and modal profile of identity.17 Along these lines, one might think that there are pragmatic
reasons to refrain from uttering sentences of the form ‘To be F is, by definition, to be
F .’ Just as it is infelicitous to respond to ‘Who is Bob?’ with ‘Bob is Bob,’ so too it is
infelicitous to respond to ‘What is virtue?’ with ‘Virtue is virtue.’ But in both cases the
answers, although entirely unhelpful, remain strictly true. And so, rather than maintaining
that there are no reflexive definitions, it might be argued that everything can be defined
reflexively.
It is not entirely clear how to make this objection stick. The defender of definition is
free to grant that there is a reflexive and symmetric reading of ‘To be F is to be G,’ but
insist that that is not the same reading as intended by their use of ‘To be F is, by definition,
to be G.’ Such a metaphysician may claim that their use of ‘definition’ refers to the subset
of identity claims that are substantive—and it is a requirement on substantiveness that the
sentence not be reflexive.18 On this use of ‘definition,’ the commitment to irreflexivity isn’t
a pragmatic matter at all, but rather a semantic one. And it is far from clear what prevents
the metaphysician from using the term ‘definition’ in that way.
There are, then, at least two reasons why some might reject irreflexivity. They might,
firstly, hold particular counterexamples in mind—perhaps a Spinozistic conception of sub-
stance. Secondly, they might insist that definitions are reflexive—because identity is reflex-
ive and performs the theoretical work attributed to definition. But I suspect that many
However, while Spinoza devotes no discussion to the status of definition in the Ethics, he does within
the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. There, he provides criteria for definition which indicates
that they are real, rather than merely nominal. He claims that if an entity is uncreated, then its definition
must not concern external objects, but that if an entity is created, its definition must specify the cause
by which it is created. Moreover, the definition of an entity—whether created or uncreated—reveals all of
its essential properties. While these are (at least somewhat) plausible criteria for real definition, they are
entirely implausible criteria for nominal definitions. There need be no reason why the nominal definition
of ‘substance’ need reveal every essential property of substances. And so, for this reason, some argue that
Spinoza’s definitions are real. See, again, Lin (2019). A more sophisticated account—according to which
Spinoza’s definitions are both real and nominal (in particular, that they take us from nominal definitions
to real definitions) occurs within Garrett (2003). It appears, then, that there is a reasonable reading of
Spinoza’s definition of substance on which it is a real definition—and a violation of irreflexivity. Those who
define substance reflexively in this manner thus have a reason to deny that irreflexivity is true.
17See, for example, Dorr (2017); Caie, Goodman and Lederman (Forthcoming); Bacon and Russell (2019);
Bacon (2019); Fritz (Forthcoming). Some also refer to these sentences as ‘just-is’ statements—see Rayo
(2013); Linnebo (2014) and ‘generalized identities’—see Correia and Skiles (2019); Elgin (Forthcomingb).
As far as I can tell, these are three labels for the same phenomenon.
18For a critique of the literature on identification along these lines, see Cameron (2014).
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will find neither alternative particularly appealing, so it is worth directing our attention to
case congruence.
Case Congruence
Case Congruence is the claim that definitions apply to their cases. If to be even is, by
definition, to be an integer divisible by two without remainder, then for four to be even is,
by definition, for four to be an integer divisible by two without remainder; and if to be a
béchamel is, by definition, to be a roux with milk, then for sauce s to be a béchamel is, by
definition, for sauce s to be a roux with milk.
As with coextensionality and irreflexivity, an initial defense of case congruence is made
by appeal to practice. If it were false, then it ought to admit of counterexample. It may
be, for instance, that to be morally right is, by definition, to maximize utility, and for
Tim’s act to be morally right is, by definition, for Tim’s act to comply with the categorical
imperative. I am aware of no philosophers who have made claims along these lines—and I
take this to indicate that the tacit commitment to case congruence is widespread.19
In light of the previously-mentioned relation between case congruence and coextension-
ality it is worth distinguishing these principles from one another. They are independent;
each could be true while the other is false. Let us stick with the previous case: suppose that
to be morally right is, by definition, to maximize utility and for Tim’s act to be right is, by
definition, for Tim’s act to comply with the categorical imperative. This, as noted above, is
a situation in which case congruence fails.20 Yet so long as Tim’s act both maximizes utility
and complies with the categorical imperative, it is no counterexample to coextensionality.
After all, Tim’s act falls within the extension of both being morally right and maximizing
utility, and the propositions Tim’s act is morally right and Tim’s act complies with the
categorical imperative are both perfectly true. So it may be that coextensionality is true
while case congruence is false.
We can also construct a case in which case congruence is true and coextensionality is
false. Suppose that for Linda to be a sister is, by definition, for Linda to be a female sibling,
19This particular example is somewhat tricky. Parfit (2011) argues that Kantianism and consequentialism
(as well as contractarianism) are unified in the sense that the best versions of the three views are the same—
advocates for each have been climbing the same mountain from different sides. A Parfitian might claim
something close to the example above: the definition of the right is given in consequentialist terms and
the definition of Tim’s act being morally right is given in Kantian terms, because consequentialism and
Kantianism are one and the same (at least when understood correctly). But this is not a counterexample
to case congruence—precisely because the Parfitian identifies the consequentialist view with the Kantian
view. A counterexample would be someone who maintains that the two are distinct, rival views—and while
the right is defined in consequentialist terms the claim that Tim’s act is right is defined in Kantian terms.
I know of no one who subscribes to such a claim.
20A bit more precisely, we could simply include the negation of ‘For Tim’s act to be morally right is, by
definition, for Tim’s act to maximize utility.’ An analogous case in which coextensionality is true yet case
congruence is false could be straightforwardly constructed along these lines.
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yet the claim that Linda is a sister is true while the claim that Linda is a female sibling is
false. Here, case congruence is vacuously true (after all, ‘Linda is a sister’ is 0-ary, and so
has no cases to apply to). Yet, here coextensionality is false. Linda falls within the extension
of being a sister yet does not fall within the extension of being a female sibling, despite the
fact that to be a sister is, by definition, to be a female sibling. And so, coextensionality
and case congruence are independent from one another.
I take it that case congruence is an extremely natural principle; one that many meta-
physicians assume without argument. But this is not to say that it has gone entirely
unchallenged. A recent (and rather sustained) discussion of this type of view occurs in Fine
(2016). The subject-matter of Fine’s discussion differs slightly from mine. While I discuss
principles of definition, Fine discusses principles of identity: what it is that grounds (or
metaphysically explains) the fact that various sorts of entities are identical. It may be, for
example, that two sets are identical in virtue of having identical members, and it may be
that two people are identical in virtue of having continuous conscience experiences. Many
maintain that there is a close connection between definition and identity criteria; it is not
uncommon for the notion of real definition to be introduced as something which provides
identity conditions. On this conception, those concerned with the definition of Socrates in-
vestigate what it takes to be identical to Socrates; and those concerned with the definition
of knowledge investigates what it takes for a mental state to be identical to knowledge.
But regardless of whether this is the appropriate way to characterize the relation between
definition and identity, it is natural to expect discussions of one to translate into discussions
of the other.
Much of Fine’s discussion concerns the priority between generic and specific identity
claims. In particular, he maintains that specific claims are metaphysically posterior to
(or hold in virtue of) generic claims. The claim ‘{Hesperus} is identical to {Phosphorus}
because Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus’ holds because sets are identical in virtue of
having identical members. It is not, in contrast, that ‘sets are identical in virtue of having
identical members’ holds (even partially) because of facts regarding {Hesperus} and {Phos-
phorus}. This view can be straightforwardly translated to a claim about definition. Along
these lines, one might maintain that generic definitions are prior to specific definitions. ‘Fa
is, by definition, Ga’ holds because ‘F is, by definition, G’ holds; it is not the case that ‘F
is, by definition, G’ holds (even partially) because ‘Fa is, by definition, Ga’ holds.
This point is orthogonal to the debate over case congruence, which takes no stand on
issues about priority. Case congruence states neither that generic claims hold because of
specific claims, nor that specific claims because of generic claims. All that it asserts is that
generic claims entail specific ones—that one may infer from ‘To be a vixen is, by definition,
to be a female fox,’ that ‘For Wanda to be a vixen is, by definition, for Wanda to be a
female fox.’
Fine also presents putative counterexamples to (the analog of) case congruence. He
maintains that some generic identity criteria do not entail all of their specific instances.
That is to say, while a claim about generic identity criteria is true, some of its corresponding
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instances are false. One such example is the following:
(Euclid) x = a, y = a ⇒ x = y21
The claims that the fact that an arbitrary x is identical to a (or, more accurately, takes
a as its value), and the fact that an arbitrary y is identical to a (or takes a as its value)
collectively ground the fact that x is identical to y. This is a generic claim—as witnessed by
the arbitrary objects description, and the free variables x, y within the formal statement.
But although this principle appears plausible enough, one of its instances is the following:
a = a, a = a ⇒ a = a
The fact that a = a and the fact that a = a ground the fact that a = a. This is false,
Fine maintains, because it violates the Non-Circularity of ground, according to which a fact
cannot (even partially) ground itself. In order to retain both the generic identity claim and
the principle of Non-Circularity, Fine rejects the view that generic claims entail all of their
specific instances.
Another example concerns a non-well-founded set theory. Consider a theory which
allows for a single non-well-founded set; set ss contains itself (and only itself), and no other
set contains itself. The following is a plausible identity criterion for ss.
x ∈ x, ∀y(y ∈ x)(y = x) ⇒ x = ss
The fact that an arbitrary set is a member of itself and the fact that all objects which
are members of that set are identical to it collectively ground the fact that that set is
identical to ss. As before, the reference to arbitrary objects (as well as the occurrence of
free variables) indicate that the criterion is generic, rather than specific. Plausible though
this principle is, one of its instances is the following:
ss ∈ ss, ∀y(y ∈ ss)(y = ss) ⇒ ss = ss
The fact that ss is an element of ss and the fact that every object which is an element
of ss is identical to ss collectively ground the fact that ss is identical to ss. But the fact
∀y(y ∈ ss)(y = xx) is itself plausibly (at least partially) grounded by ss = ss—i.e., the
fact that all objects within ss are identical to ss is partially grounded in the fact that ss
is identical to ss. This is another violation of Non-Circularity. In order to preserve the
generic principle and Non-Circularity, the link between the generic and specific identity
claims must be severed.
These are the most compelling examples I have yet come across—which is not to say that
I find them to be conclusive. For my part, I am unsure of why we ought to accept a principle
21Note that the use of ‘⇒’ here refers to grounding, rather than the material conditional, so that ‘A ⇒ B’
is to be read as ‘Fact A grounds fact B.’
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of Non-Circularity for non-well-founded set theories. If sets contain themselves, there may
be circular dependence relations. Arguably, those who would preserve Non-Circularity
principles ought to reject non-well-founded set theories, rather than the connection between
generic and specific identity claims.
In any case, to determine whether these examples provide a reason to reject case con-
gruence, we must determine whether their definitional analogues are plausible. That is to
say, we ought to replace talk of ‘identity’ with talk of ‘definition,’ and determine whether
the resulting examples carry weight. Take the following:
(Euclid*) Def(x, a), Def(y, a) ⇒ Def(x, y)
This asserts that the fact that (an arbitrary) x is, by definition, a and the fact that (an
arbitrary) y is, by definition, a collectively ground the fact that x is, by definition, y. This
simply results from replacing occurrences of ‘=’ with occurrences of Def: from taking the
principle to concern definition, rather than identity.
The analogous instance of this principle is the following:
Def(a, a), Def(a, a) ⇒ Def(a, a)
This asserts that the fact that a is, by definition a and the fact that a is, by definition,
a ground the fact that a is, by definition, a. But immediately, a crucial difference between
identity and definition arises: while identity is reflexive, definition is irreflexive.22 Because
all objects are self-identical, a in particular is self-identical; there is a fact that a = a. In
contrast, if definition is irreflexive then a is not defined in terms of itself; there is no fact
that a is, by definition, a. And because there is no such fact, the fact does not ground
itself. Quite generally, it is reasonable to maintain that non-existent facts do not ground
anything, including themselves. And so, while Fine’s original example relies upon the fact
that a = a (a fact which no doubt exists), there is no fact that a is, by definition, a to
problematize case congruence.
I note, moreover, that Euclid* is not nearly as plausible as Euclid. I see no reason to
take the fact that x and y are both defined in terms of a to ground the fact that x is,
by definition, y. Even before particular instantiations are considered, this principle clearly
leads to circular definitions. If two entities are each defined in terms of a, this principle
entails that each is defined in terms of the other. And if y takes the same value as x,
reflexive definitions immediately result; Def(x, a), Def(x, a) → Def(x, x). It seems, then,
there are ample reasons to reject Euclid*.
Consider the analogue of Fine’s second example, concerning a non-well-founded set
theory:
x ∈ x, ∀y(y ∈ x)Def(y, x) ⇒ Def(x, ss)
22This point (obviously) assumes that irreflexivity is true. Those who reject irreflexivity could not make
this appeal.
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This asserts that the fact that x ∈ x and the fact that ∀y(y ∈ x)Def(y, x) collectively
ground the fact that Def(x, ss)—i.e., the fact that x is an element of itself and the fact that
all members of x are, by definition, x collectively ground the fact that x is, by definition,
ss.
I see no reason to accept that this is true. As with Euclid*, it immediately generates
reflexive definitions. Because ss is an element of itself, this principle entails that Def(ss,
ss)—ss is, by definition, ss. If irreflexivity is true, then there is no such fact. This fact
does not stand in circular grounding relations because it doesn’t stand in any grounding
relations; facts which do not exist neither ground nor are grounded by anything at all.
The upshot is this: there is difficulty in translating Fine’s discussion concerning identity
to a discussion concerning definition. His examples originally relied upon the fact that
object s is self identical. Because all objects are self identical, such a fact assuredly exists.
But after translation, the cases concern the fact that object a is, by definition, a. If
irreflexivity holds, then there is no such fact. For this reason, it is challenging to make
these examples stick.
Case Congruence—the view that generic definitions entail their instances—is a natu-
ral assumption about definition; arguably, one that many tacitly endorse. Perhaps it is
undermined by counterexamples, but—if so—these counterexamples have not yet emerged.
Expansion
Expansion is the claim that, within the contents of a definition, terms may be replaced
by their own definitions. For example, if {Socrates} is, by definition, the set containing
only Socrates and Socrates is, by definition, the result of this sperm and that egg, then
{Socrates} is, by definition, the set containing only the result of this sperm and that egg.
And if hydrogen is, by definition, the element with a single proton and a proton is, by
definition, the particle made of two up quarks and a down quark, then hydrogen is, by
definition, the element with a single particle made of two up quarks and a down quark.
Expansion is a restricted substitution principle. It permits substitution within the
definiens—or content of definition—but not the definiendum—or object being defined. This
restriction matters because an unrestricted principle (i.e., one which allowed for substitution
within both the content and object of definition) immediately generates reflexive definitions.
Consider the following unrestricted principle:
A is, by definition, B
C is, by definition, D
∴ (A is, by definition, B)[C/D]
That is to say, if A is, by definition B and C is, by definition D, then any replacement of C
with D within ‘A is, by definition, B’ is permissible. Suppose, for example, that the property
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of being a vixen is, by definition, the property of being a female fox. This principle can be
employed to derive that the property of being a female fox is, by definition, the property of
being a female fox—a reflexive definition. Quite generally, by allowing the same example
to witness the first two conditions it is possible to derive reflexive definitions.23 Expansion,
as it is stated, does not license substitution within the definiendum, so it does not conflict
with irreflexivity in this way.
Expansion is the cousin of transitivity—the claim that if A is, by definition B and
B is, by definition, C, then A is, by definition, C. Strictly, expansion is stronger than
transitivity ; transitivity can be considered as the limiting case of expansion in which the
term being substituted for is the definiens in its entirety. But while expansion allows us
to ‘dive into’ the content of definiens and replace some terms with others, transitivity does
not—it applies only to definiens in its entirety. As such, while expansion entails transitivity,
transitivity does not entail expansion.
The commitment to transitivity is widespread—though typically without argument.24
It is often taken to be a starting-point in a theory of definition; it is considered a mark
in favor of a theory if it can be shown to be transitive. This suggests a potential path to
expansion. While one can consistently hold that transitivity is true while expansion is false,
it is not at all clear why we should expect transitivity to succeed and expansion to fail.25
Explicit commitment to expansion is less common than the commitment to transitivity
(though its explicit denial is, as far as I know, nonexistent). An exception to this general
rule is the following:
“It should be possible to prove a principle that licenses arbitrary definitional
expansion:
Def(F,Φ) and Def(G,Ψ) then Def(F,ΦΨ/G)
Where ΦΨ/G is the result of substituting Ψ for G in Φ...Any account of
real definition should license the substitution of definiens for definiendum in a
ground to yield a further ground” (Rosen, 2015, pg. 201).26
23Note that this is slightly weaker than the claim that definition is reflexive—i.e., from the claim that
every instance of ‘A is, by definition, A’ is true. There may well be some irreflexive cases; what this principle
entails is that reflexivity arises for every term that serves as the content of a definition.
24See, most explicitly, Correia (2017); Rosen (2015); Horvath (2017). For endorsements of the transitivity
of related phenomena such as ground, essence, and relative fundamentality, see, for example, Fine (1995b,
2012); deRosset (2013, 2017); Dasgupta (2016); Berker (2017); Dixon (2018). The closest thing to an explicit
disavowal of transitivity occurs in Schaffer (2012). For a reply, see Litland (2013).
25In addition, much theoretical work attributed to transitivity can only be adequately accomplished by
expansion. For example, one type of ontological dependence can be understood in terms of definitional
containment—see Fine (1995a). Entity e ontologically depends upon entity e′ just in case e′ figures within
the definition of e. Expansion can be used to derive the transitivity of ontological dependence, but transi-
tivity is strictly compatible with the claim that ontological dependence is intransitive.
26For another commitment to this type of principle, see Correia and Skiles (2019).
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Notably, Rosen claims not only that a substitution principle holds, but that it ought
to be provable that it holds. This suggests a path toward expansion; we ought to believe
it because of its proof. To the best of my knowledge, however, expansion does not follow
from any of the widely accepted principles about essence or definition. Minimally, I have
been unable to prove it from them. Those seeking a proof of expansion should look—not
to the logic of essence and definition—but to the logic of identity.
Within the recent (and rapidly expanding) literature on higher-order identity, Caie,
Goodman and Lederman (Forthcoming) provide a proof of Leibniz’s Law. The aim of
this proof is not to vindicate Leibniz’s Law, but rather to systematically investigate which
principles must be abandoned in languages with opaque predicates. As it turns out, this
derivation can be modified to prove expansion.
Let us adopt a typed, higher-order language with λ-abstraction. Within this language,
there are two basic types e, t for the type of entities and sentences respectively, and for
any types τ1, and τ2 ∕= e, (τ1 → τ2) is a type; nothing else is a type. Monadic first-order
predicates can be identified as terms of type (e → t), diadic first-order predicates are terms
of type (e → (e → t)), etc.. Monadic second-order predicates are of type ((e → t) → t),
and monadic third-order predicates are of type (((e → t) → t) → t). The negation operator
¬ is of type (t → t), and the binary operators ∧,∨,→,↔ are all of type (t → (t → t)).
Additionally, this language is equipped with infinitely many variables of every type, as well
as the quantifiers ∃, ∀ (for every type).
In first-order languages, these quantifiers perform dual functions. They serve both to
express generality and to bind the variables occurring within their scope. But in higher-
order languages, these tasks are divided: the task of expressing generality is performed by
quantifiers and the task of variable binding is performed solely by the λ-terms. Thus, ‘there
exists an F ’ is expressed as ‘∃λx.(Fx),’ rather than ‘∃x(Fx).’
Lastly, for each type τ there exists a predicate Def of type (τ → (τ → t)) which is used
to express definitions. The intended interpretation of ┌Def (τ → (τ → t))(Aτ , Bτ )┐ is ‘A is,
by definition, B.’
The principles which generate expansion (which are are either to be read as schemata
with applications in every type, or whose type is contextually evident) are the following:
MATERIAL ABSTRACTION Def(φ,ψ) → Def(λx.φ[x/a],λx.ψ[x/a])
APPLICATION CONGRUENCE Def(F,G) ∧Def(a, b) → Def(Fa,Gb)
BETA-ETA EQUIVALENCE φ may be replaced by ψ provided φ and ψ are
βη equivalent
The derivation of expansion proceeds as follows:
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i) Def(a, b) Supposition
ii) Def(φ,ψ) Supposition
iii) Def(λx.φ[x/a],λx.ψ[x/a]) ii, Material Abstraction
iv) Def(λx.φ[x/a](a),λx.ψ[x/a](b)) iii, Application Congruence
v) Def(φ,ψ[b/a]) iv, Beta-Eta Equivalence
Therefore, if material abstraction, application congruence and beta-eta equivalence are
all true, then expansion is true as well. Those who would reject expansion must also reject
(at least) one of these three principles.
Beta-eta equivalence itself follows from two principles: the claim that identification
is preserved under βη conversion and Leibniz’s Law. For example, preservation under
βη conversion entails that λx.Fx(a) = Fa and, because these propositions are identical,
Leibniz’s Law then entails that one term can be substituted for the other. Those who
reject expansion by rejecting beta-eta equivalence must also reject either the claim that
identification is preserved under βη conversion or Leibniz’s Law.
The claim that identification is preserved under βη conversion is an orthodox principle
of higher-order logic. Its most sustained defense occurs in Dorr (2017), and I have little
to add to that defense. The strongest argument against this principle arises from the view
that propositions are structured—a view radially incompatible with the claim that identity
is preserved under βη conversion. A central commitment of structured propositions is that
Fa = Gb → F = G; if the proposition that Fa is identical to the proposition that Gb then
F is identical to G. βη conversion entails λx.Rxx(a) = λx.Rxa(a): the proposition that
object a stands in relation R to itself is the same as the proposition that object a stands
in relation R to a. On the structure proposition view, this entails that λx.Rxx = λx.Rxa:
the property of standing in relation R to oneself is identical to the property of standing in
relation R to a. This is obviously absurd—the two properties need not even be coextensive.
Those who endorse structured propositions, then, have a reason to reject the claim that
identity is preserved under βη conversion—and, correspondingly, a path to rejecting both
Beta-Eta Equivalence and expansion.
However, there is an independent reason to reject structured propositions: the Russell-
Myhill problem. Another (and more general) commitment of structured propositions is
that syntactic differences correspond to propositional differences. The fact that ‘Sarah is
to the left of John’ differs syntactically from ‘John is to the right of Sarah’ entails that the
two sentences correspond to different propositions. The problem, roughly, is that for every
collection of propositions it is possible to construct a sentence asserting that precisely those
propositions are true. For this reason, there is a mapping from the powerset of propositions
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to a unique sentence (i.e., there is a mapping from each collection of propositions to the
sentence asserting that precisely the elements of that collection are true). If each sentence
itself corresponded to a unique proposition, then there would be a mapping from each
element of the powerset of propositions to a unique proposition. But Cantor’s Theorem
states that there is no such mapping. For any set s there is no mapping from every element
of the powerset of s to a unique element of s. And so, it cannot be that every syntactic
difference corresponds to a propositional difference.
Moreover, Fritz (Forthcoming) has recently demonstrated that there are other entities—
ones with the resources to evade the Russell-Myhill problem—which can perform much of
the theoretical work often attributed to structured propositions.27 A bit roughly, instead
of appealing to the structured proposition that Fa, we may appeal to the bihaecceity
R = λXe → t.λxe.(X = F ∧ x = a): a relation that property F stands in to object a and
that no property stands in to any other object. These entities are proxies for structured
propositions, but are not themselves propositions; R is a relation between properties and
objects, and is therefore not truth-evaluable. As it turns out, these proxies resolve the
Russell-Myhill, and are compatible with the claim that identity is preserved under βη
conversion.28
The upshot is this: those who endorse structured propositions ought to reject the claim
that identity is preserved under βη conversion. This might seem appealing, as it facili-
tates the rejection of both Beta-Eta Equivalence and expansion. However, the structured-
proposition view is deeply flawed (and may not even be consistent)—and at least some of
the work often attributed to it can be performed by other sorts of structures. Ultimately,
then, I doubt that the present dilemma ought to be resolved in this way.
Leibniz’s law also holds substantial appeal. If Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, then
for Hesperus to be a planet is for Phosphorus to be a planet—and if Cicero is identical to
Tully, then for Cicero to be an orator is for Tully to be an orator. The strongest reason
to reject Leibniz’s Law arises from opaque predicates.29 It may be that early Babylonians
believe that Hesperus appeared in the evening sky while denying that Phosphorus appeared
in the evening sky. If this is so, then ‘Hesperus’ may not be replaceable by ‘Phosphorus’
in some contexts—despite the fact the two are identical.30 Of course, many continue to
endorse Leibniz’s law; it is an extremely natural principle—difficult cases notwithstanding.
Application congruence allows for the combination of two definitions into one. If to be
human is, by definition, to be a rational animal and Aristotle is, by definition, the result of
this sperm and that egg, then for Aristotle to be human is, by definition, for the result of
27In particular, Fritz demonstrates their use in resolving puzzles of ground.
28I direct those interested in how this resolves the Russell-Myhill to Fritz’s original paper. Roughly,
we need only assume that the cardinality of proxies is higher than the cardinality of their relata: in the
present case, that the cardinality of relations between properties and objects is higher than the cardinality
of properties and of objects.
29Indeed, opacity might even be defined as any violation of Leibniz’s Law.
30I note, however, that there are ways of resolving Frege’s puzzle that do not involve rejecting Leibniz’s
Law. See, for example, Dorr (2014).
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this sperm and that egg to be a rational animal. Application Congruence strongly resembles
case congruence, and many reasons to accept (and reject) application congruence as well.
For the moment, suffice it to say that I can think of no plausible instances in which it fails.
Material abstraction is the near converse of case congruence. Just as case congruence
allows one to infer that ‘For Linda to be a sister is, by definition, for Linda to be a female
sibling’ from ‘To be a sister is, by definition, to be a female sibling,’ so too material ab-
straction allows one to infer ‘To be a sister is, by definition, to be a female sibling’ from
‘For Linda to be a sister is, by definition, for Linda to be a female sibling.’ The underlying
thought is that when a term appears in both the definiendum and definiens—within both
the object and content of analysis—then that term is not responsible for the definition in
question. That is to say, there is a plausible a non-circularity criterion on definition. While
terms can (and do) appear in both the object and contents of definitions, they cannot ap-
pear essentially in both the object and content—they are not the reason a given expression
constitutes a definition.31 And, because these terms are inessential, they can be abstracted
away.
To my mind, the defense of both application congruence and material abstraction are
defeasible. They are not knock-down considerations. One path to the resolution of the
problem at issue is the rejection of expansion. However, this rejection must be accompanied
by the rejection of application congruence or material abstraction (or beta-eta equivalence),
as these principles entail that expansion is true.
Definability
Definability is the claim that there exists a definition of definition. Definition does not
rank among the primitive relations—it is defined in terms of something or other. I suspect
that (at least to some) this principle seems relatively controversial. On one interpretation,
definition forms a bedrock of our discipline: a foundation upon which other philosophi-
cal accounts rest. And so the contention that definition is itself primitive is not entirely
implausible. Moreover, while the previous principles appeared to be implicit in philosoph-
ical practice, this is not so for definability. There is no reason to suspect that practicing
ethicists, epistemologists and the like tacitly assume that real definition is itself defined.
Nevertheless, numerous philosophers maintain that definability is true. Typically, this
occurs because philosophers provide an account of definition.32 That is to say, philosophers
defend a particular view about what the definition of definition is, and are thereby commit-
ted to the claim that definition has some definition or other. Correspondingly, one defense
of definability is parasitic on any argument that they provide. A reason to support their
views constitutes a reason to endorse definability.
31At least, they can appear in both the object and content of definition on the assumption that case
congruence is true.
32As before, see Rosen (2015); Correia (2017); Horvath (2017). I direct those interested in the content of
these views to their original papers.
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I believe that there is a further reason to support definability—but one that is (or at
least ought to be) controversial.
Definitions provide answers to metaphysical-why questions. Several things might be
intended by a question like ‘Why is Fred a bachelor?’ Often, it might be used to enquire
into the reason for Fred’s marital status. In these cases, responses like ‘Because he has not
yet fallen in love’ are appropriate. But there is a metaphysical reading of this question as
well—one concerning what it is in virtue of that Fred counts as a bachelor–and it is here
that an appeal to definition is made. To the metaphysician, the response ‘Because Fred is
an unmarried male and to be a bachelor is, by definition, to be an unmarried male’ seems
as satisfying an answer as any.
In a similar manner, the definition of definition provides an answer to metaphysical-why
questions. Let us suppose, for the sake of a concrete example, that to be morally right is,
by definition, to maximize utility. It seems a reasonable question to enquire why the right
is defined as it is: what makes it the case that the right is defined in terms of that which
maximized utility rather than that which cultivates the virtues. And just as the answer to
‘Why is Fred a bachelor?’ naturally appeals to the definition of being a bachelor, so too
the answer to ‘Why is the right, by definition, maximizing utility?’ naturally appeals to
the definition of definition. The reason the right is defined in terms of maximizing utility
is that it stands in the appropriate relation to maximizing utility: a relation articulated by
the definition of definition.
Those who accept definability have the resources to metaphysically explain why it is
properties and relations are defined as they are; they can appeal to the definition of defini-
tion to provide such an account. In contrast, those who reject definability cannot respond
in this way. And so, one reason to accept definability—beyond the appeal of particular
accounts of definition—is that it provides resources for metaphysical explanations that we
seek.
There is, however, a reason to reject definability : one so initially compelling that it
suggests that the preceding discussion ought to have been curtailed. As stated, definabil-
ity claims that a relation—in particular, the relation of definition—stands within its own
extension (while remaining agnostic as to what it stands in that relation to). But there
is a strong reason to deny that any property or relation falls within their own extension:
the Russell Paradox. For, if properties are contained within their extension, it is natural
to maintain that there is a property of being a property that is not contained within its
own extension: a property that falls within its own extension just in case it does not. This
problem can be avoided by denying that properties are the types of things that can fall
within their own extension. And if no property or relation falls within its own extension,
then definition does not fall within the extension of definition, and so we ought to reject
definability.
This, as I said, is an extraordinarily compelling point. It is also false. Of course,
there are numerous ways we might attempt to obviate the Russell Paradox, but the obvious
method leaves the present puzzle intact. While outright contradiction is avoided, the conflict
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between the five principles at issue remains. What is this obvious method? To adopt a typed
higher-order language in which the claim that properties fall within their own extension are
strictly ungrammatical, and so inapt for truth or falsity.
Fortunately, we have already encountered such a language, so no new formalism is re-
quired. As before, let us assume that there are two basic types, e and t (for the types of enti-
ties and sentences respectively), and that for any types α,β, (α → β) is a type, and nothing
else is a type. We allow for infinitely many variables of every type, and the corresponding
λ abstracts needed to bind them. Furthermore, for any type α there exists a predicate Def
of type α → (α → t) with the intended interpretation that Defα → (α → t)(Aα, Bα) asserts
that A is, by definition, B. Because this language is typed, the Russell Paradox is avoided.
The only additional symbolism—which I introduce solely to reduce the length of types in
the principles and subsequent derivation—is α2 (for a generic type α) which is shorthand
for α → (α → t). Relatedly, (α → t)2 is shorthand for (α → t) → ((α → t) → t)).
With this language in place, the five principles at issue can be stated in a logically
precise manner. Strictly, these principles become schemata with applications for each type
α. In cases where the type is not explicitly mentioned, it is contextually evident.
COEXTENSIONALITY: Def t2(P t, Qt) → (P t ↔ Qt)
IRREFLEXIVITY: ¬∃λXα.Defα2(X,X)
CASE CONGRUENCE: Def (α → t)2(Fα → t, Gα → t) → Def t2(Fα → t(aα), Gα → t(aα))
EXPANSION: (Defα2(Fα, Gα) ∧Defβ2(Hβ , Iβ)) → Defα2(Fα, Gα [I/H])
DEFINABILITY: ∃λXα2 .Defα2 → (α2 → t)(Defα2 , X)
Most of these amount to the reframing of the original principles in a paradox-free lan-
guage. Definability, for example, amounts to the claim that there is a higher-order definition
for each lower-order definition. Coextensionality, however, has been restricted to its rele-
vant application: it is stated for the case of terms of type t (the only type relevant to the
derivation of this puzzle) rather than for all types generally.
The framing of this puzzle within a typed language offers another potential resource.
It may be that different principles are rejected for different types. Perhaps, for example,
Definability is to be rejected for the predicate Def e → (e → t) while expansion is to be rejected
for the predicate Def (e → t) → ((e → t) → t). However, I can think of no reason to reject
different principles for different types, so I merely note that it is an option in logical space.
Within this language, the conflict can then be derived in the following way:
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The upshot, then is this: there was a presumptive concern regarding definability. It
appeared to assert that a relation—in particular the relation of real definition—fell within
its own extension. This naturally gives rise to paradox, and provides an initial reason to
reject definability. However, once we shift into a typed language, the threat of paradox
is removed, and yet the present conflict remains. And so, if there is a reason to reject
definability, it is not due to the threat of paradox.
Conclusion
I close by returning to where we began: a discussion of the expanded postulate for a theory
of definition. I have no doubt that some readers suspect that this expanded postulate
(whatever it may be) constitutes the definition of real definition. What definition is is that
relation that performs the theoretical work attributed to real definition. And so, once we
identify what that work consists of, we will thereby have identified what the definition of
definition is.
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Lewis (1970)’s original work suggests that this is incorrect. Note that his account con-
cerns how to define theoretical terms, rather than properties and relations. That suggests
that it provides nominal definitions, rather than real definitions. The expanded postulate
constitutes a nominal definition of ‘Definition’ rather than a real definition of definition. It
merely specifies what the word means as used by the metaphysician.
My own view is that matters are not so straightforward. What an expanded postulate is
is the formal description of the theoretical function that a property (or relation) performs.
Properties or relations which are defined in terms of their expanded postulate are thus
those which are functionally defined. If definition is one such property—if it is functionally
defined—then its expanded postulate provides its real definition. In contrast, if definition is
not functionally defined, then its expanded postulate provides a merely nominal definition.
The debate over the relation between definition and its expanded postulate can thus be
understood as a debate over whether definition is itself functionally defined.
There is a conflict between the principles coextensionality, irreflexivity, case congruence,
expansion and definability. Each holds at least some measure of initial appeal, and while
there are modest reasons to reject some, many have a great measure of support.
Perhaps some will respond to this result by abandoning the theory of definition whole-
sale. I myself am skeptical of that approach—the difficulty of rejecting one principle is no
reason to reject five. Although I ultimately take no stand on how this puzzle ought to be
resolved, something must be done; the contradiction cannot be allowed to stand.
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